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Introduction
In recent years, Blue Cross plans have successfully converted from nonprofit (NP) to for-profit (FP) organizational status in 14 states and Puerto Rico.
1 These wellpublicized transactions represent a general transition towards FP ownership, particularly in the health maintenance organization (HMO) segment of the health insurance industry.
For example, in 1985 only 26% of HMO enrollments were in FP HMOs. By 1999, the FP percentage of HMO enrollments had risen to 64%. The shift towards FP ownership has raised questions and concerns about how it will affect the performance of the HMO market.
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The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between organizational form and pricing behavior in the HMO industry. We focus on two related questions. First, do NP HMOs set prices (premiums per member month) differently than FP HMOs, after accounting for their respective market settings? Second, are differences in pricing conduct suppressed in more competitive HMO markets, where there are more HMOs and demand is presumably more price elastic? We hypothesize that NP HMOs set higher prices than FP HMOs in relatively uncompetitive markets, but that increases in competition lead to a convergence between NP and FP prices. We refer to this as the "convergence hypothesis" and provide supporting evidence in the empirical section of the paper.
We offer a theoretical explanation for why prices follow the patterns that we hypothesize. If a NP HMO derives utility from conduct that raises its marginal cost of 3 enrollments (e.g., it values the quality of services its members receive, less stringent underwriting standards, lax managerial effort, etc.), then it will also be optimal for it to set a higher price than FP HMOs. However, where competition for enrollments is more vigorous, the NP HMO gains utility by having a more efficient cost structure. 3 Therefore, in more competitive markets the NP HMO substitutes away from activities that increase marginal cost and allocates its surplus to objectives that do not increase its marginal cost (e.g., by instead investing its surplus in greater statutory reserves, acquisitions of other HMOs, etc.). As the marginal cost of the NP HMO falls, it also adjusts its price downwards towards the level of FP HMOs.
We test the convergence hypothesis on a sample of non-IPA model HMOs between the years 1994-1998. Our tests support the hypothesis that NP HMOs charge higher prices than FP HMOs in less competitive markets, especially those markets with high per capita income. The results also demonstrate that NP prices converge to FP price levels in highly competitive markets. Specifically, we find that NP prices are more responsive to competition than FP prices. We estimate that each additional HMO competitor causes a NP HMO to reduce its premium per member month by about 3%.
The comparable FP price response to a marginal competitor is indistinguishable from zero. The differential NP price response to competition eventually leads to price convergence. These findings are robust to a wide range of specifications, econometric corrections and divisions of the sample.
While our results focus solely on price, they have potentially wide-ranging implications. Theoretically, prices are linked to marginal costs and empirical differences 4 in price can be used to infer differences in cost behavior. 4 Differences in pricing behavior therefore indicate that there are differences in production and/or outputs across ownership types. We are unable to identify the nature of these differences in this study, but suggest that this may be a fruitful area for future research.
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Our findings are also relevant to the current policy debate that focuses on the ownership structure of the industry. Our results imply that as the industry becomes increasingly competitive, NP and FP behavior will converge, making the issue of ownership less relevant for at least this (non-IPA) segment of the HMO industry. It is noteworthy that our data indicate that the HMO industry is becoming increasingly competitive, as measured by the number of HMOs in each market.
We also contribute to the literature on FP and NP competition in markets with mixed ownership. Prior research has addressed the question of coexistence of organizational forms and theorized that NP and FP forms in the same market serve different consumer segments. 6 Our approach is somewhat different, in that we demonstrate convergence in pricing that results directly from competition both between and among organizational forms. Our results are also relevant to the literature on competition in the HMO industry. Previously, Wholey et al. (1985) documented a negative price response of HMOs to competition using data similar to, but somewhat older than ours. 7 We borrow from the methodology of Wholey et al. and also find a 5 significant price response to competition, but we find that the effect is largely confined to NP HMOs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model that generates the convergence hypothesis. We discuss the data and methods in section 3 and the results are reported in section 4. The paper concludes in section 5 with a brief discussion.
Theory
In this section we develop our theory and hypotheses. Our theory is based upon assumed differences between NP and FP HMO objectives that lead to predicted differences in pricing behavior across markets. We use the theoretical framework to develop the paper's main hypotheses.
The Basic Model: Costs and the Impact of Competition
We assume that HMOs face downward sloping demand curves in monopolistically competitive markets. Downward sloping demands result from switching costs and other product differentiating factors such as benefit design and the composition of the provider panel. 8 Second, we assume that consumers do not differentiate between FP and NP HMOs based solely upon their organizational form -FP and NP HMOs are viewed by consumers as identical, ceteris paribus, and have the same demand curves.
8 Downward sloping demands are also assumed by Wholey et al. (1995) .
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For-profit and nonprofit HMOs maximize different objective functions, which leads to differences in both costs and pricing. For-profit HMOs profit maximize, setting price according to the familiar monopoly pricing rule, written here as,
where i indexes the individual for-profit HMO, p is price, q c is marginal cost and q is quantity (e.g., number of individuals enrolled in the health plan).
NPs face a non-distribution constraint and therefore must expend their surplus internally 9 . We distinguish between two possible uses for the surplus, which we label x and y. Both x and y are goods and provide utility to the HMO. The pertinent difference between x and y is that x enters the HMO's cost function and increases its marginal cost of enrolling individuals while y does not. For example, x may refer to increases in the quality of care, a relaxation of underwriting standards, reductions in managerial effort, etc. 10 Conversely, y refers to increases in financial reserves which can be used to hedge financial risk 11 or fixed expenditures that do not affect the marginal cost of enrollments such as acquisitions of other health plans, expenditures on managerial salary and perquisites, upgrades to administrative buildings, etc.
9 NP HMOs have the same profit potential as FP HMOs. However, they are not obligated to pay returns to shareholders (and are not 100% debt financed), so they have an economic surplus to allocate internally. 10 In this paper, we do not investigate the question of whether NP expenditures on x are welfare increasing or decreasing. We simply define x such that increases in x increase the HMO's marginal cost without shifting the demand curve outward (e.g., increases in quality are not "paid back" by increases in demand). It may be that increases in x provide a social benefit such as increasing insurance coverage or increasing the quality of care. Or it may be the case that increases in x provide no social benefit at all. We leave this question to other research. We are principally focused on convergence between FP and NP prices. 11 Unspent (invested) profits act as a hedge against the risk of future insolvency or service curtailment. Unlike FP corporations, NPs cannot rely upon financial diversification on the part of their investors (e.g., donors or the community) to hedge against the financial risk of financial downturns. Donations and tax subsidies are not perfectly elastic to such downturns. For this reason, NP entities act as risk-averse entities that accumulate financial surplus as a hedge against risk (Wedig, 1994) .
Given these assumptions, the NP HMO's problem is to choose p, x and y in order to maximize, ) , (
subject to the breakeven constraint,
The distinction that we draw between x and y is reflected in the positive cross partial derivative, . We assume that for-profit and nonprofit costs, c(.), are identical in the special case where x is set equal to zero.
The NP problem yields first order conditions for both price and the choice of x (y is a residual). The equation for optimal price is of the same form as the for-profit pricing equation:
The equation for x is given by:
These first order conditions are intuitive. NPs select price in the same way as FPs but they do so conditioned on a higher level of marginal cost that results from NPs setting x > 0. Similarly, the NP HMO equates the marginal cost of increasing x with the ratio of the marginal utilities of x and y. 14 We readily acknowledge that there may be other theoretical models that are capable of generating these predictions. For example, if markets with fewer HMOs are characterized by greater barriers to entry, then potential profits may be greater in these markets. NP HMOs that value both x and y (as defined in our model), would optimally consume more of both x and y in less competitive markets. The greater consumption of x in less competitive markets would lead to the same results predicted by the model given in this paper. In our empirical section we use an instrumented value of market structure that arguably removes the effects of barriers to entry on our predicted measure of market structure, and hence provides a cleaner test of our model. 15 A model of interaction between NP hospitals in the provision of charity care is provided in Frank and Salkever (1991) . They argue that NP hospitals compete to give more charity than the average community standard. Their model contradicts the ideas presented here, in that it implies that NPs would not want to give resources to their rivals if it caused their rivals to provide more charity care than themselves.
objectives, then the effect of NP competition on NP prices will be weaker than the effect of competition from FP competitors.
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Hypotheses
For clarity, we state three formal hypotheses.
H1)
As a result of their higher marginal costs (due to their consumption of x), NPs set higher prices than FP HMOs.
H2)
Increases in the price elasticity of demand (due, for example, to increased market competition from other HMOs) has a more negative effect on the prices of NP HMOs than the prices of FP HMOs.
H3)
Competition from NP HMOs has a significantly less negative effect on NP prices than competition from FP HMOs.
For convenience, we refer to H2 as the "convergence hypothesis." We refer to H3
as the "common altruism hypothesis."
Data and Methods
Sample Selection -Non-IPA Model HMOs
We test our hypotheses on a sample of non-IPA model HMOs that report data to 
Data
Our sample is constructed in three steps using data from four different sources.
First, we construct a cross section-time series ( The MSA Trend file also provides us with data on HMO penetration within the MSA.
The ARF provides us with data on per capita income, population density, percent of employment in manufacturing, percentage of low birth weight births, physicians per capita and Medicare enrollees per capita at county level. We aggregate the ARF county data to the MSA level by using county population weights.
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In our second step, we merge the MSA file information onto an HMO-level file, 
Specification and Hypothesis Tests
3.3.a Dependent Variable and Study Variables
Our dependent variable is log price. This use of logs is consistent with the comparative statics analysis reported in the Appendix. Logging price also helps to minimize the influence of outlier values. Price is defined as total premium revenue divided by total member months.
Our independent variables are divided into three groups: 1) measures of ownership and market structure; 2) HMO characteristics and 3) market-area controls.
The coefficients from our empirical model provide a direct test of the theory and hypotheses developed in section 2. Suppose that the equation for FP HMO prices is:
where "Number of HMOs" is a count of HMOs in the MSA, our proxy of the level of competition in the market, and Z is vector of HMO-level and market-area controls, including an intercept.
Further, suppose that the equation for NP HMO prices is:
The difference between these two equations is that the coefficient vector ( β ,δ ) differs across equations. Note that our theory predicts that: 14 Given these two specifications, we can combine nonprofit and for-profit observations into a single equation in order to facilitate direct tests of our hypotheses: 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, the common altruism hypothesis, we divide the sample into markets according to the market share of FP enrollments. The common altruism hypothesis predicts that f n β β − will be significantly more positive (less negative) in markets with a higher share of NP enrollments.
HMO and Market Controls
We include a set of HMO and market controls (the vector of variables, Z, referenced above). Each control variable is entered individually and interacted with the nonprofit dummy. Our HMO-level variables include dummy variables to indicate that the HMO is: a) federally qualified, b) a national HMO; and/or c) affiliated with Blue
Cross. These controls are important to the extent that they control for product 20 Specifically, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the net effect of all of the NP interactions will fit higher NP prices, before accounting for competition. The positive effect of NP status on prices may be found in a positive coefficient estimate on a simple NP dummy variable (i.e., NP status interacted with the intercept) or in positive interactions of NP status with some subset of market and/or organizational controls.
15 differentiation that affects costs and pricing. Attaining federally qualified status should increase costs, so the predicted sign of this variable is positive. National plans may achieve scale economies, which reduce their costs. Its predicted coefficient is therefore negative.
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Our market level controls are divided into health and non-health related measures that shift the supply and/or demand for HMO services. Among the set of non-health market controls, we include per-capita income and population density. A higher per capita income should shift out demand and have a positive coefficient. A higher population density reduces the costs of delivering health care services because the HMO can serve the same population with a smaller geographic network of providers and sites of care. We predict that its effect on price is negative.
Our health-related market controls include HMO penetration, physicians per 1,000 population and the MSA hospital market's Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI).
Holding the level of competition fixed, HMO penetration proxies the health status of the marginal HMO enrollee. The greater the level of HMO penetration, the worse the health status of the marginal enrollee, assuming that the HMO market selects the healthier risks first. The predicted effect of HMO penetration on prices is positive. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we predict that the interaction terms of nonprofit status with the control variables will fit a higher predicted NP price, before accounting for the effects of competition. For example, while per capita income has a positive predicted coefficient, we predict that that its coefficient will be more positive for NP HMOs.
Econometric Methods
Our econometric approach addresses two primary issues: 1) the potential endogeneity of the number of HMOs in the market; and 2) the panel structure of our data.
Among our study variables, the number of HMOs in the market is likely endogenous.
The number of HMOs in an MSA, for example, may respond positively to unmeasured (positive) shifters of demand. This is relevant in our case, because our data indicate that during the period from 1994-1998 the average number of HMOs in each market was growing. Failure to address endogeneity will positively bias the coefficient on the number of HMOs.
To address endogeneity, we estimate a first-stage regression for the number of HMOs in the market and use the predicted value in a second stage instrumental variables 23 In some preliminary specifications we also include controls for percentage of low birth weight births in the market, percent of the population employed in manufacturing, the occupancy rate in the hospital market and the number of Medicare enrollees per capita in the market. We find that none of these controls are statistically significant and that the inclusion of the added controls has very little effect on the point estimates of the market structure variables. We opt to present more economical specifications that exclude these variables. We summarize the effects of including these variables in our discussion on robustness in section 4. (IV) regression. The principle identifying variables included in the first-stage regression, (and not included in the second stage IV regression) are: 1) the total population in the MSA; and 2) the level of Medicare payments for Medicare HMO enrollments.
The second issue that we address is the panel structure of our data. Because we have a short panel, we do not use fixed or random effects. Instead, we address the resulting serial correlation in the error term by using a two-step estimator to correct for first-order serial correlation within each HMO's observations. In the first step, an AR (1) parameter is estimated, while in the second step we obtain Prais-Winsten corrected estimates. We are able to verify that serial correlation is absent in the corrected estimates. Finally, we make use of White's test (White, (1980) ) to verify homoscedasticity of the errors. We are able to accept the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in all reported regressions. Table 1 Table 2 presents means and median values of selected study variables by quartile of competition. Competition is defined as the number of HMOs operating in the market. Price is defined as the per member per month premium. For price, we compute both parametric (t-tests) and nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) of differences between NP and FP prices by quartile. We also compute both parametric (t-tests) and nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) of differences in price and selected study variables between the first and fourth quartile of competition. 
Results
Descriptive Data by Quartiles and Simple Correlations
Main Regression Results
Table 4 presents our main regression results for HMO price, using two different models that differ only by their treatment of the potentially endogenous "Number of HMOs." The second model uses a predicted value of "Number of HMOs" in the regression, obtained from a regression reported in the Appendix. In both regressions, we This represents an approximately 60% increment in price over the FP price level, at the sample mean per capita income level of $25,000. This increment in price is substantially offset by the less positive NP price response to physicians per capita and federally qualified plan status. Combined, these two effects reduce the relative NP price by approximately 25% at the sample mean. Overall, taking account of all of the estimated 24 As expected, the fitted effect of "Number of HMOs" for FP HMOs is more negative (less positive) in the IV regression. However, it is indistinguishable from zero in the IV results. 25 We lose 33 observations from the full sample in the estimation of these regressions (613 versus 646). These missing observations are due to a combination of missing values for physicians per capita and observations that were lost due to the execution of the AR (1) correction.
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NP interaction coefficients, fitted NP prices exceed FP prices by more than 28%, before accounting for the effects of competition.
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The results also show that NP prices are more responsive to competition than FP prices. In the IV model, the NP price response to competition is approximately 3.1 percentage points greater than the FP price response (t-statistic = 3.94). This result is consistent with the "convergence hypothesis" which predicts that NPs charge higher prices than FP HMOs in less competitive markets but converge towards FP prices in more competitive markets. At the mean level of competition (9.75 HMOs in a market), the NP response to competition fully offsets the 28% increment in prices that exists in the absence of competition, and prices converge.
Overall, our estimated model predicts that markets with high per capita income, with low numbers of physicians and low competition are characterized by relatively high nonprofit prices and vice versa. Intuitively, the effect of per capita income is consistent with the theory that, as demand shifts outward, (due to increases in per capita income), NP HMOs engage in cost-increasing conduct unless subjected to at least average levels of competition. Table 5 presents estimates where we divide our sample according to whether the NP HMO competes in a "predominately nonprofit" versus "mixed" market environment.
Results in Primarily Nonprofit Versus Mixed Markets
Specifically, "predominately NP" is defined as less than 35 percent FP market share and 26 That is, if one multiplies each of the NP incremental effects by the sample mean of the variable and sums the result, the net effect is more than 28% before accounting for competition.
Number of Observations
Number Table 5 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSION OF HMO PRICE ON PLAN AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS BY MARKET TYPE
Model 1-NPs Only Model 2 * Statistically significant at the .10 level in two-tailed tests ** Statistically significant at the .05 level in two-tailed tests *** Statistically significant at the .01 level in two-tailed tests Model 1 presents the results from an IV regression of HMO price on HMO plan and market characteristics where the sample is restricted to 108 nonprofit HMO observations from markets with less than 35% for-profit share. Model 2 includes observations from both nonprofit and for-profit HMOs operating in mixed markets, defined as those markets having a for-profit share greater than 35%. Model 2 includes a full set of interactions with nonprofit status. The second column of regression coefficients under model 2 captures the incremental difference associated with an HMO being NP. Both models include the instrumented value of the number of HMOs obtained from a first stage equation. Both models use the Prais-Winsten correction for serial correlation. In both models, homoscedasticity is verifed using White's test. T statistics are given in parentheses.
"mixed" is defined as greater than 35 percent FP market share. 27 The purpose of dividing the sample in this manner is to test whether the NP response to competition is smaller where the set of competitors is primarily nonprofit. A weaker competitive response by NPs in predominately NP markets is predicted by the "common altruism" hypothesis discussed in section 2.
Model 1 presents the results of an IV regression of NP prices in predominately nonprofit environments. Here the sample is restricted to NP HMOs only, because the sample size of FP observations is very small in predominately NP markets 28 . The results from model 1 indicate that the NP price response to an additional competitor is actually stronger than the NP price response estimated in the full sample and reported in Table 4 .
In Table 5 , the estimated price effect of an additional competitor is an almost 5% reduction in price, compared to the 3.1% point estimate in the overall sample. This suggests that competition among NP HMOs is vigorous, contrary to the hypothesis of "common altruism".
Model 2 presents the results from mixed markets, defined as markets where the FP share of enrollments exceeds 35 percent. Here the fitted effect of competition on NP prices is again negative and comparable in magnitude to the fitted effect in Table 4 (about 3.5% if the two columns for "Number of HMOs are added). The fitted effect of competition again indicates that NP HMO prices are more sensitive to competition in mixed markets than FP prices and more responsive to market-level per capita income as well. 27 We choose 35 percent as our dividing point between "predominately nonprofit" and "mixed markets" because this cutoff assigns half of our nonprofit observations to each market definition. 28 We have only 22 FP observations in primarily NP markets. This makes it impossible to obtain efficient estimates of the fully interacted model.
Overall, Table 5 provides little support for the "common altruism" hypothesis.
Instead, the differential price response of NP HMOs to competition appears to be robust across market settings of different types, regardless of the FP or NP share of market enrollments. 
Simulations
Robustness Checks
Our results are robust to our choice of specification and econometric approach.
To evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the specification, we estimate numerous alternative models in which we vary the sets of controls included. We obtain similar estimates if we omit any or all of the plan or market controls, with the exception of per capita income. If we omit all plan and market controls, except for per capita income, the differential NP price response to competition falls from 3.1% to 1.8%, but remains significant at the 1% confidence level. If we omit only per capita income from the 29 The simulations utilize the regression results from Table 4 , model 2. 
For-profit HMO Price Non-profit HMO Price
Number of Competing HMOs Figure 1 simulates the prices of for-profit and non-profit HMOs in mixed markets using the results from the Table 4 IV Regression. All variables are assumed to be equal to their sample means and the umber of HMOs is permitted to vary from 5 -13 HMOs corresponding to the 25th and 75th percentile of competition. The horizontal axis is the number of competing HMOs and the vertical axis is the log of the predicted HMO price specification, the differential NP price response falls from 3.1% to 1.4%, but remains statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
We also estimate models with additional controls including the percentage of low birth weight births in the market, percent of the population employed in manufacturing, the occupancy rate in the hospital market and the number of Medicare enrollees per capita in the market. We find that none of these controls, or their interactions with NP status, is statistically significant and that their inclusion has little effect on the point estimates of the study variables. 30 We choose to exclude them because there is little theoretical basis for their inclusion.
While our Prais-Winsten correction should eliminate serial correlation, rendering multiple years of observations from the same HMO independent, as a robustness check we also estimate the regression models year by year. The point estimates of the incremental NP price response to competition (Number of HMOs * NP HMO) are shown in Panel A of Table 6 . All of the point estimates are negative, as expected, and three of the five estimates are statistically significant despite the fact that each regression has little more than 100 observations. Moreover, the average coefficient across years is negative 2.9%, approximately the same result reported in Table 4 .
Finally, if we estimate the models without the Prais-Winsten correction for AR(1), the results are also similar. The incremental NP price response to competition is then negative 2.8% with a t statistic that exceeds 5. Evidently, the AR (1) correction primarily affects our estimates by adjusting the estimated standard errors of the coefficient estimates upwards. This is the expected effect of this correction, since OLS 30 Inclusion of all four variables, both alone and interacted with NP status (eight additional variables), reduces the point estimate of the differential NP price response to competition from 3.1% to 2.6%, with the result still significant at the 1% confidence level. 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 * Statistically significant at the .10 level in two-tailed tests ** Statistically significant at the .05 level in two-tailed tests *** Statistically significant at the .01 level in two-tailed tests Table 6 presents the results of IV regressions in which the log of HMO price is regressed on HMO plan and market characteristics. HMO price is defined as the per member per month premium. The "number of HMOs" is the predicted value from a first stage equation. The models are estimated separately for each year in our sample. While the models estimated are identical to those presented in Table 4 , only selected coefficients are presented. Panel A presents the results for our sample of non-IPA model HMOs, while Panel B presents the results for IPA model HMOs. T-statistics are in parentheses.
coefficient estimates are unbiased but give downward biased estimates of the standard errors where there is positive autocorrelation (Greene, 1998 ).
Model Estimation in an IPA Sample
We argue in section 3 that there is little theoretical basis for the convergence hypothesis within IPA model HMOs. Nonetheless, we test our models 31 on a sample of IPA model HMOs to see if our theory applies to this sample as well. We find that if we pool IPA with non-IPA HMOs and include (or don't include) a dummy variable for IPA models, all of our results continue to hold, although the coefficients on competition and per capita income are smaller in magnitude than in the pure non-IPA sample. For example, the incremental NP effect of competition on price falls to about 2% from 3.1%
(still statistically significant at the .01 level). 
Conclusion
31 The full results are not presented here. However, they are available from the authors.
In this paper, we find empirical support for two propositions. First, in the absence of competition, non-IPA model NP HMOs charge higher prices than non-IPA FP HMOs.
The price increment increases systematically with the per capita income of the market.
Second, competition, as measured by the number of competitors in the MSA market, reduces the price differential and eventually leads to convergence in pricing behavior. then, upon inspection, it is apparent that A > 0, B < 0, C > 0, D < 0 and E < 0.
Inverting the system of equations and solving, 0 ) ( ) (
where we now use the superscript n to designate this as the nonprofit result. We assume
as a basic condition of stability.
Note that the for-profit HMO's comparative statics are just a simpler version of the NP problem where the total derivative is confined to (A3) and where dx = 0. From this it follows that:
where we now use the superscript f to designate this as the for-profit result. To complete the proof, we focus on the expression for A, noting that A may, in general, differ across the for-profit and nonprofit cases 33 .
Given the assumption that costs are Cobb-Douglas, we can write q C C, α = where α is a positive constant that does not vary across FP and NP HMOs. 34 Using this identity, the expression for A in equation (A6) can be written as: 33 Note that E does not vary across firms or ownership forms. 
Appendix 2 FIRST STAGE OLS REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF HMOs ON MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
This table presents the results from an OLS regression of the number of HMOs in a market on market and regional characteristics. The predicted number of HMOs is subsequently used as an instrument for the instrumental variables regressions shown in Tables 4-6 . T-statistics are in parentheses.
